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Non-technical summary: This paper analyses whether wages in Germany re-
spond to rm-specic protability conditions. Particular emphasis is given to the
question of whether the sensitivity of wages to rm-specic rents varies with collec-
tive bargaining coverage. To address this issue, we distinguish sector-specic wage
agreements, rm-specic wage agreements and wage determination without any bar-
gaining coverage. Theoretical considerations lead us to expect the sensitivity of wages
to rm-specic rents to be larger under rm-specic contracts than in non-covered
rms. The same is likely to hold for industry-wide agreements, provided the bargain-
ing parties make use of exibility provisions, which recently have become a widespread
element of central wage agreements. Since direct information on the use of exibility
provisions in rms subject to an industry-wide wage agreement is unavailable, we
take our empirical ndings as an indirect test of whether the use of such provisions
is a quantitatively important phenomenon in Germany.
Using linked employer-employee data from the mining and manufacturing sector,
our empirical analysis o¤ers a remarkably consistent picture: We nd evidence that
individual wages are positively related to rm-specic quasi-rents, but this appears
to be conned to the non-union sector and to rm-specic contracts. Industry-wide
wage agreements, in contrast, appear to suppress rent-sharing at the rm level. While
pooled OLS estimates yield a positive correlation between wages and quasi-rents un-
der centralised contracts, estimates accounting for unobserved individual and estab-
lishment heterogeneity point to a coe¢ cient of zero. Di¤erenced GMM estimates
accounting for the endogeneity of our protability measure even point to a negative
relationship between wages and rm-specic protability under centralised contracts.
This leads us to conclude that the lower responsiveness of wages to rm-specic condi-
tions under centralised contracts is not simply due to a downward-bias caused by the
endogeneity of quasi-rents. In examining the impact of collective bargaining coverage
on the wage-prot relationship, our ndings therefore suggest that centralised wage
bargaining suppresses any positive responsiveness of wages to di¤erent protabil-
ity conditions, and that the use of exibility provisions in central wage agreements
appears to be empirically negligible. To reconcile this result with the fact that a con-
siderable fraction of rms covered by a collective contract pay wages above the going
rate, we conclude from our ndings that such wages do not result from di¤erences in
protability conditions, but rather reect observable and unobservable di¤erences in
worker quality.
As to the importance of worker characteristics, the invariance of wages against
rm-specic conditions is found to be largest for low- and medium-skilled blue-collar
workers. This is consistent with our hypothesis that the extent of inter-rm wage
compression under centralised contracts ought to be particularly pronounced among
those workers who are likely to be covered by collective contracts. In non-covered
establishments, we nd medium-skilled and male workers to benet to a larger extent
from their employersability-to-pay than unskilled and female workers, which lends
support to the hypothesis that rent-sharing in non-covered plants mainly results from
the bargaining power of works councils.
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Abstract
Using a linked employer-employee data set, this paper analyses the relation-
ship between rm-protability and wages. Particular emphasis is given to the
question of whether the sensitivity of wages to rm-specic rents varies with
collective bargaining coverage. To address this issue, we distinguish sector-
specic wage agreements, rm-specic wage agreements and wage determina-
tion without any bargaining coverage. Our ndings indicate that individual
wages are positively related to rm-specic rents in the non-union sector and
under rm-specic contracts. Industry-wide wage contracts, however, seem to
suppress rm-level rent-sharing. While pooled OLS estimates yield a positive
correlation between wages and quasi-rents under centralised contracts, esti-
mates accounting for unobserved individual and establishment heterogeneity
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endogeneity of our protability measure even point to a negative relationship
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1 Introduction
A central question in the economics of wage determination is to what extent wage dif-
ferentials reect di¤erences in worker characteristics or di¤erences across employers
for identical workers. With regard to the latter, rm-specic protability conditions
have been widely recognised as a major source of employer-specic wage di¤erentials.
The existing literature o¤ers competing explanations for a positive relationship be-
tween wages and rmsability to pay, such as short-run frictions in a competitive
labour market, e¢ ciency wage mechanisms and union power. An empirical test of a
positive wage-prot correlation is generally seen as an indirect test of the competitive
labour market theory, since the latter is di¢ cult to reconcile with a long-run corre-
lation between wages and prots (see e.g., Blanchower et al. 1996, Hildreth and
Oswald 1997).
A large number of studies have attempted to quantify the impact of protabil-
ity conditions on wages. Early studies date back to Slichter (1950) who reports
a positive correlation between wages and employers ability to pay using industry
data from U.S. manufacturing. Later work on inter-industry wage di¤erentials doc-
uments persistent wage di¤erentials across industries that appear to be correlated
with industry-prots (Dickens and Katz 1987, Krueger and Summers 1988, Katz and
Summers 1989 and Blanchower et al. 1996). Most of this work controls for system-
atic worker di¤erences across industries by using individual data which are matched
to industry-specic protability measures. However, in relying on aggregate prot
data those studies typically fail to account for a within-industry correlation between
rm prots and wages. Studies using rm-level data overcome this problem, but in
general do not control for worker quality (e.g., van Reenen 1996, Hildreth and Os-
wald 1997, Dobbelaere 2004). Given that one is generally interested in the question
of whether identical workers obtain higher wages in more protable rms, an ideal
data set would include linked information on both employers and employees. With
this information at hand, it would be possible to account for non-random sorting of
high quality workers into more protable rms. Moreover, linked employer-employee
data do also allow to control for unobserved worker and rm heterogeneity, as long
as they are available in a longitudinal dimension. To date, there are only few studies
investigating the wage-prot relationship using matched worker-rm data. Examples
include Margolis and Salvanes (2001), Arai (2003), Kramarz (2003), Nekby (2003) as
well as Martins (2004).
The primary objective of our paper is to explore the linkages between rm-specic
prots and individual wages using German linked employer-employee data. Partic-
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ular attention will be paid to the question as to whether the sensitivity of wages
to rm-specic prots depends on collective bargaining coverage. In pursuing the
issue of labor market institutions, our paper is related to a second strand of lit-
erature, which emphasises the role of the bargaining structure for the magnitude
of inter-industry wage di¤erentials. Based on cross-country comparisons, Holmlund
and Zetterberg (1991), Edin and Zetterberg (1992) and Kahn (1998) nd countries
with highly centralised and coordinated bargaining institutions to exhibit substan-
tially lower inter-industry wage variation than countries with relatively decentralised
bargaining systems. Our paper di¤ers from this literature, in that we (1) focus on
interrm wage di¤erentials and (2) exploit intra- instead of international variations
in the bargaining structure.1
The German case provides an instructive example for the co-existence of di¤erent
bargaining structures. Until the early 1990s, wage determination was dominated by
centralised wage bargaining between industry-specic unions and employersassocia-
tions. However, in the last decade, there has been a tendency towards decentralisation
of wage determination, since rm-specic collective wage agreements as well as wage
determination without any bargaining coverage have become more important (Hassel
1999, Ochel 2005). Even within centralised industry agreements, there have been
numerous attempts to allow for more (downward) exibility of wages by introduc-
ing opening and hardship clauses. Moreover, since bargained wages in centralised
agreements merely represent a lower bound for wages, there is also su¢ cient room for
upward exibility. Given that recent decentralisation tendencies have introduced - at
least formally - the possibility to adjust wages to local conditions at the rm level,
a further purpose of the paper is to shed light on the following questions: Do rm-
specic contracts and exibility provisions in centralised industry agreements allow
for rent-sharing at the rm level? If yes, does the extent to which wages respond to
prots di¤er from that in rms without any bargaining coverage? Moreover, linked
employer-employee data also allow us to address the question as to whether certain
groups of workers benet more from rmsability-to-pay than others. There are only
few previous studies on the relationship between wages and prots in Germany and,
to our knowledge, there is no study that uses matched worker-rm data. Hübler and
König (1998) and Klodt (2000) use data from the Hannover Establishment Panel.
They report a signicant positive impact of prots on average rm wages, but do
not allow the e¤ect to vary with bargaining coverage. In own recent work, we use
data from the IAB Establishment Panel and nd wages to be positively related to
1Moreover, there are number of related studies which use intra-national variations in bargaining
structures to analyse the impact of the bargaining structure on the wage level and on the returns to
worker attributes. See e.g. Hartog et al. (2002a, 2002b) and Cardoso and Portugal (2005).
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establishment-prots. However, this appears to be true only for non-covered estab-
lishments, since we fail to detect any positive relationship between wages and local
protability conditions in plants that are subject to a collective wage agreement -
irrespective of whether the agreement is industry- or rm-specic (Gürtzgen 2005).
However, like any other analysis using such aggregate data, these results are subject
to the limitations of establishment- or rm-level data. First, there may be unob-
served worker heterogeneity, which is unlikely to be fully captured by establishment
level data. Second, aggregate data generally provide a rather crude measure of wages.
The IAB Establishment Panel only o¤ers information on the reported wagebill exclu-
sive of fringe-benets or bonus payments. Whenever rent-sharing takes the form of
such supplemental payments, the use of these data will clearly entail an understate-
ment of the true wage-prot relationship.
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between wages and protability using
the IAB Linked Employer-Employee data set (LIAB) which combines data from the
Employment Statistics Register and the IAB Establishment Panel. This data set is
especially useful for our purposes since it enables us to match individual data with
establishment-specic information on value added and collective bargaining coverage.
A particular advantage is the exact information on earnings due to the administrative
nature of the Employment Statistics Register. In our estimation strategy, we rst
focus on simple static pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) estimates. The OLS
estimations serve as a benchmark case and will be modied in various respects. First,
we will address the possibility of unobserved individual time invariant factors. Second,
we will consider both establishment- and individual-level unobserved heterogeneity
by estimating di¤erenced spell xed-e¤ects models. A nal problem concerns the
endogeneity of our protability measure, since wages and prots are simultaneously
determined. To address this problem, we will instrument prots by using a di¤erenced
GMM-estimator according to Arellano and Bond (1991).
The main results can be summarised as follows: We nd evidence that individual
wages are positively related to local protability conditions. However, this seems to
be true only for wage determination in the non-union sector and under rm-specic
contracts. For establishments covered by an industry-wide wage contract, pooled
OLS estimates yield a positive correlation between wages and quasi-rents, but esti-
mates accounting for unobserved individual and establishment heterogeneity point
to a coe¢ cient of zero. In examining the impact of collective bargaining coverage
on the wage-prot relationship, our ndings therefore support the notion that cen-
tralised wage bargaining suppresses any positive responsiveness to local protability
conditions. Di¤erenced GMM estimates accounting for the endogeneity of our prof-
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itability measure even point to a negative relationship between wages and rm-specic
protability under centralised contracts. This leads us to conclude that the lower re-
sponsiveness of wages to rm-specic conditions under centralised contracts was not
simply due to a downward-bias caused by the endogeneity of quasi-rents.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the institutional background
is presented in Section 2. Section 3 outlines the general empirical model and derives
testable hypotheses about the degree of rent-sharing under di¤erent bargaining set-
ups. Section 4 describes the data set and the main variables used in the subsequent
analysis. Section 5 presents the results from the pooled OLS, xed-e¤ects and
di¤erenced GMM estimations. Finally, Section 6 provides a discussion and some
conclusions.
2 Is there any scope for rm-level rent-sharing in
Germany?
The German system of wage bargaining is usually characterised as medium-centralised,
with regional and industry-wide collective wage agreements (Flächentarifverträge)
being the predominant form of wage determination (Calmfors and Dri¢ ll 1988, Sos-
kice 1990, OECD 2004). Such central wage agreements are negotiated between an
industry-specic trade union and an employersassociation. They are legally binding
for all rms being member of the respective employersassociation and for all em-
ployees who are members of the trade union. Although the negotiated wage applies
strictly speaking only to union members, member rms generally extend the wage
settlement to non-member employees as well.2
Given the predominance of centralised wage bargaining, there appears to be little
scope for rm level rent-sharing in Germany. Yet, a closer look at German wage
determination o¤ers a more subtle picture. Since the early 1990s, German indus-
trial relations have experienced a clear tendency towards more decentralised forms
of wage determination (see e.g. Hassel 1999, Kohaut and Schnabel 2003). This ten-
dency is caused by three major developments. First, rm-specic collective wage
agreements have become more frequent. Those agreements are negotiated between
an individual rm and industry-specic unions. Second, wage determination with-
out any bargaining coverage is becoming more relevant. In rms not being covered
2The reason is that non-unionised employees who would receive a lower wage may be expected
to join the union anyway in order to benet from the higher union wage. Moreover, central wage
agreements may also apply to non-member rms and their employees if the agreement is declared
to be generally binding by the Federal Ministry of Labour.
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by a collective agreement wage determination may either take the form of individ-
ual wage contracts or of plant-specic agreements (Betriebsvereinbarungen) between
works councils and the management.3 Third, there is a tendency even within cen-
tralised wage agreements to allow for more exibility at the rm-level. In recent years,
contractual opt-out clauses or hardship clauses have become a widespread element of
central agreements. While opening clauses delegate issues that are usually specied
in the central agreement, such as working-time and pay-conditions, to the plant-level,
hardship clauses enable rms to be exempted from the centralised agreement if they
are close to bankruptcy. In general, the adoption of such clauses requires the ap-
proval of the collective bargaining parties (Hassel 1999, Ochel 2005). Moreover, since
bargained wages in centralised agreements merely represent a lower bound for wages,
there is also su¢ cient room for upward exibility.4 To sum up, recent decentralisation
tendencies in Germany have introduced - at least formally - the possibility to adjust
wages to local conditions at the rm level. However, at this point it is worthy to note
that the question of whether this potential has really been exploited still remains to
be answered empirically. For example, even though contractual opening and hard-
ship clauses have become an important (formal) element of centralised agreements,
empirical evidence on the use of such clauses is rather sparse.5
3 Empirical Model and Testable Hypotheses
In order to quantify the relationship between wages of individual workers and their
employersability-to-pay, we consider a wage equation taking the following form:
lnwit = + j(i;t)t+ x0it+ u0i+ w0j(i;t)t+q0j(i;t)+t Dt+i+j(i;t)+it (1)
There are i = 1,..., N individuals, and N =
P
Ti total worker-year observations.
Since we will use individual data that are matched to establishment-level data, j(i; t)
refers to the establishment which employs individual i at time t; with j = 1; :::; J:
The dependent variable, lnwit; is the individual log daily wage. The explanatory
3According to the German Works Constitution Act, works councils are not allowed to negotiate
about issues that are normally dealt with in collective agreements, even in rms that are not parties
of a collective agreement. In practice, however, works councils may be expected to play a crucial
role in wage determination (see e.g. Hassel 1999, Hübler and Jirjahn 2003).
4Using data from the IAB Establishment Panel, Bellmann et al. (1998) nd about 50 per cent
of all Western German establishments that are covered by a collective contract to pay wages above
the going rate.
5One exception is the study by Franz and Pfei¤er (2003), who analyse this issue based on an
employer-survey of about 800 German rms. Their results indicate that only 18 per cent of those
employers that covered by a collective contract allowing for hardship clauses make use of such
provisions.
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variable of main interest is j(i;t)t; measuring (time-varying) establishment-specic
per-capita protability.6 x0it represents a vector of time-varying individual covariates
with a coe¢ cient vector , while u0i denotes a vector of individual time-constant
characteristics with a coe¢ cient vector . Similarly, w0j(i;t)t and q
0
j(i;t) represent time-
varying and time constant j level covariates with coe¢ cient vectors  and : i
and j(i;t) denote individual and establishment-specic unobserved heterogeneities.
Finally, industry dummies are included to capture industry-specic factors, such as
the overall level of industry demand and the degree of competition. Time dummies
Dt are included to capture common macroeconomic shocks, and it is a white-noise
error term.
Since the emphasis of our analysis is on the impact of collective bargaining cov-
erage on the sensitivity of wages to local protability conditions, the coe¢ cient  is
specied to depend on the contract-type:
 = 0 + _CENT  CENTit + _FIRM  FIRMit; (2)
where CENT is a dummy taking the value of unity if an establishment is subject
to an industry-wide collective wage contract and FIRM takes on the value of unity
if an establishment is covered by a rm-specic contract.
Bargaining power considerations suggest the sign of _FIRM to be positive, i.e.
the sensitivity of wages to local prots is likely to be larger under rm-specic con-
tracts than in non-covered establishments. An important argument is that rm-
specic contracts in Germany are concluded by industry-specic unions. This dis-
tinguishes German rm-specic collective wage agreements from similar wage agree-
ments in other countries, as e.g. in the U.K., where rm-specic unions bargain
independently from each other (see e.g. OECD 2004). For this reason, the bargain-
ing power of works councils determining wages in non-covered establishments may be
expected to be considerably lower than that of an industry-wide union, which deter-
mines wages under rm-specic contracts. This prediction is re-enforced by the fact
that the wage bargaining process under rm-specic contracts is highly coordinated
by an industry-wide union, whereas it is completely uncoordinated in non-covered
plants. While wage-setting acteurs in non-covered plants have an incentive to cut
wages in order to gain a larger share of industry-demand, this competitive mecha-
nism completely disappears with an industry-union (see Gürtzgen 2005). This leads
6Particularly in case of multi-plant rms, it might be argued that rm-level protability provides
a more appropriate measure than establishment-level protability. However, we do only have access
to the establishment-level measures, which we take as a proxy for rm-level protability.
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us to expect an industry union to capture a larger share of rents under rm-specic
contracts than, say, works-councils in non-covered establishments.
The sign of _CENT cannot be predicted a-priori, since this depends on the frac-
tion of rms making use of exibility provisions in centralised wage agreements. Since
our data lack explicit information on the use of such provisions, we will take our em-
pirical ndings as an indirect test of whether such provisions are really exploited. In
this case, _CENT might be expected to be positive (for the same reason as under
rm-specic contracts). Conversely, testing _CENT =  0 provides a direct test of
a complete invariance of wages against rm/establishment-specic conditions. Note
that a rationale for why unions might favour a compressed intra-industry wage struc-
ture could be workersdemand for income insurance. The idea that wage compression
might provide insurance against income risk has been taken up by several authors.
Horn and Svensson (1986) show that union contracts may help to enforce implicit
contracts between risk-averse workers and risk-neutral rms facing uncertainties over
the business-cycle. Agell and Lommerud (1992) interpret wage compression across
di¤erent skill groups as insurance against ex-ante uncertainties over skill endowments.
Burda (1995) takes this approach further and analyses unionsreactions to changes
in the distribution of uncertainties. Note that in our context, intra-industry wage
compression provides insurance against two dimensions of uncertainties. First, wage
compression between rms at a given point in time may reduce income risk if workers
face uncertainties over the allocation to more or less protable rms. Second, given
that with a compressed intra-industry wage structure wage growth is likely to depend
on changes in average sector performance, workerswages in a given rm should also
be sheltered against uctuations in rm-level protability over time.
Having derived hypotheses about the role of collective bargaining for the wage-
prot relationship, it may also be useful to consider the importance of individual
characteristics. The di¤erential e¤ects measured by the interaction terms ought to be
particularly pronounced among those groups of workers who are likely to be covered
by collective contracts. While our data contain information on collective bargaining
coverage at the establishment level, they unfortunately lack explicit information on
whether an individual worker is covered or not. There are a number of studies that
analyse the determinants of individual union membership in Germany (e.g., Beck
and Fitzenberger 2004, Goerke and Pannenberg 2004), but empirical evidence on
individual collective bargaining coverage is rather scarce.7 International empirical
7Note that individual union membership is not a necessary condition for individual bargaining
coverage, since rms often extend the wage contract to non-member employees as well.
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evidence suggests individual non-coverage to be particularly relevant among high-
skilled managerial workers (see e.g. Hartog et al. 2002a). As a result, we expect the
interaction e¤ects to be stronger for low- and medium-skilled blue-collar workers.
In non-covered establishments, a positive wage-prot correlation may result from
the bargaining power of individuals and works councils on the one hand and from
e¢ ciency wage mechanisms on the other hand. The latter give rise to a positive
correlation between wages and prots due to productivity enhancing e¤ects. Such
e¤ects may arise, for example, from reductions in turnover and shirking (see e.g.
Krueger and Summers 1988). Thus, e¢ ciency wage considerations lead us to expect
the wage-prot correlation to be particularly strong among the better educated, since
those workers are more likely to accumulate rm-specic human capital and are less
likely to be supervised than low-skilled workers. This raises the relative incentive
for employers to pay above market-clearing wages in order to reduce turnover and
shirking. Note that the supervision argument should also hold for white-collar as
compared to blue-collar workers. The same conclusions can be drawn in case of rent-
sharing as the result of individual wage bargaining power, because highly educated
workers may be expected to have better outside options and higher bargaining power
than low-skilled individuals. Finally, rent-sharing in non-covered establishments may
also result from the bargaining power of works councils. Thus, the extent of rent-
sharing ought to be larger for those groups of workers whose wages are likely to
be a¤ected by works-councils. Empirical evidence on the presence of works-councils
generally suggests that the likelihood of codetermination increases with the share of
male as well as skilled workers (see Addison et al. 1997, Hübler and Jirjahn 2003,
Zwick 2004). This may be interpreted as a weak hint for wages of those groups being
more likely to be inuenced by works councils than those of female and low-skilled
individuals.
4 Data and Variable Description
The empirical analysis uses the IAB Linked Employer-Employee data set (LIAB)
which combines data from the IAB Establishment Panel and the Employment Sta-
tistics Register. The IAB Establishment Panel is based on an annual survey of West-
German establishments administered since 1993 by the research institute of the Fed-
eral Employment Services in Nuremberg (IAB - Institute of Employment Research).
East German establishments entered the panel in 1996. The database is a represen-
tative sample of German establishments employing at least one employee who pays
social security contributions. The survey data provide numerous information on es-
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tablishment structure and performance, as e.g. sales, the share of materials in sales
and investment expenditures (see e.g. Bellmann et al. 2002). Moreover, the data set
contains information on whether an establishment is covered by an industry-wide col-
lective wage agreement, a rm-specic wage agreement or by no collective agreement
at all.
The worker information comes from the Employment Statistics Register, which is
an administrative panel data set of all employees paying social security contributions
(see e.g. Bender et al. 2000). The data are based on notications which employers
are obliged to provide for each employee covered by the social security system. Those
notications are required whenever an employment relationship begins or ends. In
addition, there is at least one annual compulsory notication for all employees who
are employed on the 31st December of each year. Due to its administrative nature,
this database has the advantage of providing reliable information on daily earnings
that are subject to social security contributions. The establishment and worker data
sets contain a unique establishment identication number. This allows us to match
information on all employees covered by the social security system with the estab-
lishments in the IAB Establishment Panel.
The construction of the Linked Employer-Employee data set occurs in two steps:
First, we select establishments from the establishment panel data set. From the avail-
able waves 1993 to 2001, we use the years 1995 to 2001, since detailed information
on bargaining coverage is available only from 1995 onwards. Since information on a
number of variables, as e.g. sales and the share of materials in total sales are gathered
retrospectively for the preceding year, we lose information on the last year. Moreover,
we restrict our sample to establishments from the mining and manufacturing sector
with at least two employees. We focus on these industries, since the introduction of
opening and hardship clauses here has been particularly relevant in central collective
wage agreements. These sectors therefore provide an particularly interesting case for
testing the empirical relevance of the use of such clauses. As we will apply dynamic
panel data methods, only establishments with consistent information on the variables
of interest (described below) and at least three consecutive time series observations are
included in our sample. This results in a sample of 843 establishments with 3,498 ob-
servations, yielding an unbalanced panel containing establishment-observations with,
on average, 4.15 years of data.8
8Originally, the sample includes 2,897 establishments with consistent information on all the vari-
ables of interest. 12 observations were dropped due to suspected errors in the rent variable. These
observations featured per-capita values of rents of above 1 million DM. This results in a sample of
2,891 establishments with a total of 6,404 observations. Only 843 of those feature at least three
consecutive time-series observations.
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In the second step, the establishment data are merged with notications for all
employees who are employed by the selected establishments on June 30th of each
year. From the worker data we drop observations for apprentices, part-time workers
and homeworkers. To avoid modeling human capital formation and retirement de-
cisions, we exclude individuals younger than 19 and older than 55. Moreover, since
we consider only full-time workers, we eliminate those whose wage is less than twice
the lower social security contribution limit. In order to be able to conduct rst-
di¤erencing, we consider only those individuals for whom at least two consecutive
time series observations are available. The nal sample comprises 333,045 individuals
in 821 establishments, yielding an unbalanced panel containing 3,361 establishment
years and 1,305,705 individual observations with, on average, 3.92 years of data for
each worker.9
The individual data include information on the gross daily wage, age, gender,
nationality, employment status (blue-/white-collar), education (six categories)10 and
on the date of entry into the establishment. The latter is used to approximate tenure
by subtracting the entry date from the ending date of the employers notication
which is available from the worker data. Note, however, that this proxy does not
account for potential employment interruptions which might have occurred during
this time span.
The dependent variable in the subsequent analysis will be the real gross daily wage.
Since there is an upper contribution limit to the social security system, gross daily
wages are top-coded. In our sample, top-coding a¤ects 7.7 per cent of all observations.
To address this problem, we construct 36 cells based on education, gender and year.
For each cell, a tobit regression is estimated with log daily wages as the dependent
variable and individual and establishment covariates as well as industry dummies
as explanatory variables (see Table 1 below). As described in Gartner (2005), right-
censored observations are replaced by wages randomly drawn from a truncated normal
distribution whose moments are constructed by the predicted values from the Tobit
regressions and whose (lower) truncation point is given by the contribution limit to the
social security system. After this imputation procedure, nominal wages are deated
by the Consumer Price Index of the Federal Statistical O¢ ce Germany normalised
to 1 in 2000.
9Note that the exclusion of certain individual groups entails a loss of 22 establishments.
10The categories are: No degree, vocational training degree, high school degree (Abitur), high
school degree and vocational training, technical college degree and university degree. Missing and
inconsistent data on education are corrected according to the imputation procedure described in
Fitzenberger et al. (2005). This procedure relies, roughly speaking, on the assumption that indi-
viduals cannot lose their educational degrees.
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Turning to the establishment variables, the main variables used in the subsequent
empirical analysis are dened as follows. Following the majority of the rent-sharing
literature (see e.g. see Abowd and Lemieux 1993, van Reenen 1996), establishment
protability, , is measured by per-capita quasi-rents. We choose quasi-rents - dened
as value-added minus the opportunity cost of labour - for two reasons. First, from a
theoretical perspective quasi-rents may be interpreted as representing the pieto be
divided between the bargaining parties. Second, from an econometric perspective, the
use of quasi-rents instead of prots enables us to circumvent the endogeneity problem
induced by the accounting relationship between wages and prots. In particular, we
construct per capita quasi-rents as the di¤erence between annual sales, material costs
and the alternative annual wagebill divided by establishment size, so that
 =
SALES  MATERIALCOST   w  SIZE
SIZE
: (3)
Establishment size (SIZE) is calculated as the number of employees reported
for the month June averaged over the present and preceding year. The alternative
wagebill, w  SIZE, is dened as the annual wagebill which each rm would incur if
it had to pay the average industrial wage. Thus, we approximate w by the weighted
average of industry-specic wages for blue- and white-collar workers (separately for
West and East Germany), with the weights being the establishment-specic shares of
those worker groups in the total work force.11 The fractions of blue- and white-collar
workers are taken from the establishment data because the Employment Statistics
Register provides the individual employment status only for full-time workers. All
monetary values are expressed as real values by deating them with a sector-specic
producer price index normalised to 1 in 2000. Industry-specic price indices and
wages are obtained from the Federal Statistical O¢ ce Germany and are matched to
the establishment-data on the basis of a two-digit sector classication.
Note that the protability measure does not account for capital costs, because
our data lack explicit information on such costs. However, we attempt to control
for di¤erences in capital intensities. As we do not directly observe the capital stock,
we need to construct a proxy. We measure capital by using the perpetual inventory
method starting from the capital value in the rst observation year and using the in-
formation on expansion investment in the following years. The initial capital value is
proxied by dividing investment expenditures in each establishments rst observation
11We convert sectoral hourly industrial wages of blue collar workers into monthly wages by multi-
plying them with rm-specic average working time. Since information on average sectoral wages of
white-collar workers is available only on a monthly basis, we are not able to adjust those wages for
rm-specic average working time. Monthly values are converted into annual values by multiplying
them with the factor 12.
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year by a pre-period growth rate of investment, g; and a depreciation rate of capital,
:12 Capital-stocks in subsequent periods are calculated by adding real expansion in-
vestment expenditures.13 To obtain real values, nominal investment expenditures are
deated by the producer price index of investment goods of the Federal Statistical
O¢ ce Germany. The capital-labour ratio, K=L, is constructed by dividing the re-
sulting capital proxy by establishment size. Finally, further establishment variables
include the existence of a works council as well as information on industry-specic
and rm-specic collective bargaining coverage.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the subsequent analy-
sis. The rst two columns report statistics averaged over individuals, whereas the last
two columns present statistics that are averaged over establishments. Note that both
statistics partly di¤er substantially from each other due to the underlying distribution
of establishment size. Because larger establishments pay on average higher wages and
are more protable in terms of per-capita quasi-rents, the underlying sample means
are lower on the establishment level. Moreover, there are also considerable di¤er-
ences with respect to collective bargaining coverage. In particular, it can be seen
that large establishments are much more likely to be covered by an industry-wide
agreement, whereas small establishments are more likely to belong to the non-union
sector. As a result, the overwhelming majority of individuals (88 per cent) are em-
ployed by an establishment that adopts an industry-wide agreement. The fraction of
individuals in establishments that are subject to a rm-specic agreement amounts
to 8 per cent. Finally, only 4 per cent of all individuals are subject to no agreement
at all, even though the fraction of non-covered establishments amounts to about 26
per cent. Breaking down the sample into those individual observations covered by
an industry-wide agreement, a rm-specic agreement and into those without any
bargaining coverage reveals that wages are highest under industry-wide agreements
and lowest without any bargaining coverage (see Table A1 in the Appendix). The
variability in wages is higher for individuals without any bargaining coverage with a
coe¢ cient of variation of 0.08 as compared to 0.06 and 0.07 for individuals who work
in an establishment that is covered by a collective contract. Moreover, workers cov-
ered by rm-specic agreements are, on average, employed by more protable rms,
followed by those working in rms that are subject to an industry-wide agreement.
12This involves the assumption that investment expenditures on capital have grown at a constant
average rate, g; so that the capital stock in the base year is K1 = I0 + (1  )I 1 + (1  )2I 2+
::: = I1
P1
s=0[
1 
1+g ]
s = I1=( + g): In particular, to calculate K1, we set  = 0:1 and g = 0:05 (see
Hempell 2002).
13More specically, Kt = Kt 1(1  )+ It 1 = Kt 1+EIt 1; where Kt is the capital stock at the
beginning of period t; i.e. at the end of period t 1, and EIt are expansion investment expenditures
in period t:
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Denition Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev.
Individual level Establishm. level
Individual characteristics
lnw Real log daily wage in DM 5.21 0.31 4.94 0.33
FEMALE Female worker 0.19 0.39 0.24 0.22
AGE Age in years 39.05 9.03 38.92 3.42
TENURE Tenure in months 135.62 86.15 93.95 48.73
FOREIGN Foreign worker 0.10 0.31 0.06 0.10
WHITECOLL White-collar worker 0.37 0.48 0.32 0.22
VOCATIO Vocational Degree 0.67 0.47 0.75 0.20
HIGHSCHOOL Highschool Degree 4.7e 03 0.07 3.8e 03 0.02
VOC-HIGH Voc. and Highschool Degree 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.05
TECHN-UNI Technical Univ. Degree 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.08
UNI University Degree 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.07
Establishment characteristics
 Per-capita quasi-rents 1.06 0.79 0.68 0.80
SIZE Establishment size 6,680.86 12,430.56 550.89 2,075.87
CENT Centralised agreement 0.88 0.31 0.62 0.44
FIRM Firm-specic agreement 0.08 0.25 0.12 0.26
WCOUNCIL Works council 0.97 0.15 0.64 0.47
K/L Capital-labour ratio 1.94 4.01 2.25 12.3
EAST Eastern Germany 0.15 0.35 0.43 0.49
Individuals 333,045
Establishments 821
Source: LIAB 1995-2001. 821 establishments, 333,045 individuals, 1,305,705 observations.
Note: Per-capita quasi rents and the capital-labour ratio are measured in 100,000 DM.
1 e corresponds to 1.95583 DM.
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5 Results
5.1 Estimation Strategy
We rst focus on a simple static pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) specication
of eq. (2), in which neither i nor j(i;t) are controlled for. The POLS estimations
serve as a benchmark case and will be modied in various respects: First, we control
for individual unobserved heterogeneity to assess the extent to which unobservably
more productive workers work in more protable plants. Second, we address the
possibility of unobserved plant-specic time invariant factors. Finally, we address the
endogeneity of per-capita rents by using dynamic panel data methods.
5.2 Pooled OLS-Results
Table 2 reports the results from the POLS estimations of the impact of quasi-rents per
worker on individual log wages. Quasi-rents are specied in levels rather than logs,
since the use of logs would have required discarding all observations with negative
quasi-rents.
In the rst simplest model, which includes quasi-rents as the only explanatory
variable, the estimate of quasi-rents per employee on the individual wage is 0.110.
Adding individual characteristics increases the explanatory power of the model con-
siderably (by a factor of more than six) and reduces the coe¢ cient to 0.059, sug-
gesting that almost 50 per cent of the correlation between rents and wages is due to
systematic sorting of workers across rms (Model (2)). In particular, high-qualied
workers appear to be associated with more protable rms. The e¤ects of rents on
wages are further reduced when including other establishment characteristics, such
as establishment size, bargaining coverage, the existence of a works council and the
capital-labour ratio (Model (3)). Apart from the capital-labour ratio K=L, all control
variables enter the regression with their expected sign and are all signicant at the
1 per cent level. In line with earlier evidence, establishment size is found to have a
signicant positive e¤ect on individual wages.14 In the literature, a positive rm size
e¤ect is usually explained by di¤erences in protability conditions, capital equipment,
worker quality and monitoring costs among others (see e.g. Oi and Idson 1999). As
our specications explicitly control for worker quality, the capital-labour ratio and
quasi-rents, the establishment size variable may be interpreted as capturing some
part of unobserved worker quality and technology di¤erences.
14For German evidence on employer size e¤ects see e.g. Schmidt and Zimmermann (1991) and
Gerlach and Hübler (1998).
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Table 2: Pooled OLS regression results
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 0.110 0.059 0.037 0.025 0.033 0.097
(0.016) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.014)
_CENT -0.073
(0.014)
_FIRM -0.008
(0.016)
SIZE/1000 0.018 0.014 0.008 0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
SIZE2=1000 -3.10e 07 -2.40e 07 -1.17e 07 -1.12e 07
(5.22e 08) (5.48e 08) (4.95e 08) (4.82e 08)
CENT 0.129 0.077 0.079 0.139
(0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.031)
FIRM 0.099 0.064 0.074 0.063
(0.034) (0.029) (0.026) (0.028)
WCOUNCIL 0.154 0.146 0.117 0.113
(0.024) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020)
(K/L) -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0:002) (8:01e 04) (8:02e 04) (6:92e 04)
EAST -0.244 -0.243 -0.237
(0.017) (0.014) (0.014)
Individual No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls
Ind.-/Time No No No No Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.09 0.563 0.624 0.674 0.695 0.699
Establishments 821 821 821 821 821 821
Individuals 333,045 333,045 333,045 333,045 333,045 333,045
Observations 1,305,705 1,305,705 1,305,705 1,305,705 1,305,705 1,305,705
Source: LIAB 1995-2001.
Note: The dependent variable is the individual log daily wage. Standard errors are in parentheses,
and are adjusted for clustering at the establishment level. Individual control variables include gender,
nationality, education (6 categories), a dummy for white-collar workers, tenure, tenure squared,
age, age squared. Specications (5) and (6) include 16 two-digit industy-dummies and 5 time dummies.
Signicant at 1%-level, Signicant at 5%-level.
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The e¤ects of quasi-rents on wages are further reduced after adding an east-
west dummy, which is in accordance with less favourable economic conditions in East
German establishments (Model (4)). Moreover, controlling for establishment location
leads to a larger and more precise estimate of the capital-labour ratio on wages,
indicating systematic di¤erences in capital intensity across regions. Note that the
coe¢ cients on CENT and FIRM drop signicantly in Model (4), which reects the
much lower extent of collective bargaining coverage among East German employers.
Given the predominance of industry-level wage bargaining, it might be conceivable
that the positive e¤ect of quasi-rents on wages was primarily due to rent-sharing on
the industry level. For this reason, we investigate whether the positive correlation is
robust to the inclusion of 16 two-digit industry dummies (Model (5)). Controlling for
industry a¢ liation increases the coe¢ cient on rents even somewhat, suggesting that
the sensitivity of wages to quasi-rents estimated by Models (4) and (5) mainly refers
to within industry rent-sharing.
Finally, our main interest concerns the question whether the rent-coe¢ cient varies
systematically with collective bargaining coverage. To investigate this issue, Model
(6) includes interactions between collective bargaining coverage and rents. The results
indicate that the extent to which wages react to local protability conditions is sig-
nicantly lower in establishments that are covered by a centralised wage agreement.
However, the null hypothesis of 0 =  _CENT can be rejected at conventional
levels, suggesting that the overall impact of rents on wages is still positive. In estab-
lishments that are covered by a rm-specic contract, wages do not appear to be less
sensitive to rents as the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is found to be insignicant.
5.3 Individual xed-e¤ects
Even though we have controlled for observable individual characteristics, it might
be conceivable that the positive e¤ect of quasi-rents on individual wages was due
to sorting of unobservably more productive workers into more protable establish-
ments. To assess the extent to which sorting a¤ects our estimates, we next control
for unobserved individual heterogeneity. First-di¤erencing of eq. (2) sweeps-out the
individual e¤ect i:
 lnwit =  j(i;t)t+ x0it+ w0j(i;t)t+q0j(i;t)+t Dt+j(i;t)+it (4)
Note that rst-di¤erencing also eliminates individual time-constant characteristics
ui, so that the coe¢ cient vector  cannot be identied.15 Model (1) and (2) in Table
15In our specication, individual time-constant covariates are gender and nationality.
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3 report the individual rst-di¤erenced regressions results. The specications include
the full set of time-varying covariates from Model (5) and (6) in Table 2. While
Model (1) contains no interaction terms, Model (2) allows the coe¢ cients to vary
with collective bargaining coverage. Note that the number of observations drops
from 1,305,705 to 971,057 since we lose one observation for 331,442 individuals and
two observations for those (1,603) whose time series exhibits a gap.
In Model (1), quasi-rents enter the equation with a positive sign, but the coe¢ cient
is not statistically signicant. Interestingly, in Model (2), where the e¤ect is allowed
to vary with collective bargaining coverage, the coe¢ cients are more precisely esti-
mated. While the coe¢ cient on quasi-rents is signicantly positive for non-covered
establishments, the e¤ect is found to be signicantly lower under centralised wage
agreements. In contrast to the POLS results, a Wald-test fails to reject the null
0 =  _CENT (with a p-value of 0.59), indicating that the overall e¤ect of rents on
wages is even zero under centralised contracts. For rm-specic contracts, the inter-
action term is found to be negative, but not signicantly di¤erent from zero. Overall,
the estimated e¤ects of quasi-rents on wages are much lower than the POLS estimates.
This nding is indicative of some systematic sorting of unobservably more productive
workers into more protable rms. Given that the POLS upward-bias is found to be
relatively larger under centralised agreements, sorting appears to play a major role
for rms that are covered by a centralised wage contract. One possible explanation
might be that centralised wage contracts lead to a more compressed wage structure
across skill groups which causes rms to upgrade the quality of their workforce. For
Germany, this is supported by evidence from Dustmann and Schönberg (2004) who
nd covered rms to exhibit a more compressed wage structure and to provide more
training than non-covered rms. Note that this might lead to higher unobserved
worker productivity in such rms and therefore to (relatively larger) upward-biased
estimates in the simple pooled OLS-specication.
As regards the remaining establishment variables, in both specications establish-
ment size, the works council and the east-west dummy are found to be signicantly
di¤erent from zero and enter the equations with their expected sign. Presumably
due to their low variability over time, the collective bargaining dummies and the
capital-labour ratio are imprecisely estimated and are for the most part incorrectly
signed.
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Table 3: Individual and spell rst-di¤erenced regression results
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual Spell
xed-e¤ects xed-e¤ects
 0.004 0.014 0.005 0.015
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
_CENT -0.012 -0.012
(0.005) (0.005)
_FIRM -0.001 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
SIZE/1000 0.017 0.017 0.023 0.023
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
SIZE2/1000 -1.58e 07 -1.62e 07 -2.18e 07 -2.22e 07
(4.67e 08) (4.66e 08) (7.66e 08) (7.66e 08)
CENT -0.006 4.15e 04 -0.006 7.80e 03
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
FIRM -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
WCOUNCIL 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.030
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
(K/L) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(8.88e 04) (8.65e 04) (0.001) (0.001)
EAST -0.033 -0.034
(0.011) (0.012)
Establishments 821 821 821 821
Individuals 333,045 333,045 333,045 333,045
Observations 971,057 971,057 970,545 970,545
Adj. R2 0.074 0.074 0.075 0.076
Source: LIAB 1995-2001.
Note: The dependent variable is the rst-di¤erenced individual log daily wage.
Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the
establishment level. Individual control variables include education (6 categories),
a white-collar-dummy, tenure, tenure squared, age, age squared. The models include
16 two-digit industy-dummies (only individual xed-e¤ects) and 4 time dummies.
Signicant at 1%-level, Signicant at 5%-level.
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5.4 Spell xed-e¤ects
Apart from unobserved individual heterogeneity, a further source of bias may be the
presence of unobserved establishment e¤ects that are correlated with our protability
measure. In our context, the presence of unobserved establishment heterogeneity may
result from neglected capital costs in the quasi-rent measure as well as from di¤erences
in technological conditions16 that are not captured by our control variables. In this
case, consistent estimates of the parameters of interest may be obtained by taking
di¤erences within each individual-establishment combination (see Abowd et al. 1999).
Andrews et al. (2005) label these combinations as individual-establishment-spells.
Dening s = i + j(i;t) in eq. (2) as the unobserved spell-level e¤ect for spell s,
rst-di¤erencing of eq. (2) yields:
 lnwit =  j(i;t)t+ x0it+ w0j(i;t)t+ q0j(i;t)+t Dt+s+it (5)
Thus, rst-di¤erencing of eq. (2) removes s; as long as di¤erencing occurs within
each spell. In addition to eliminating individual time-constant characteristics, rst-
di¤erencing sweeps out time-constant establishment variables q0j(i;t), so that the coe¢ -
cient vector  cannot be identied either.17 The extent to which the spell xed-e¤ects
estimates di¤er from the individual xed-e¤ects results depends on the fraction of in-
dividuals who move between establishments within our sample. In the extreme case of
no turnover between sample establishments, spell- and individual xed-e¤ects would
yield the same results, and i and j(i;t) could not be separately identied. Table 4
reports the distribution of the number of spells. The gures show that the majority
of individuals (99.84 per cent) do not move between establishments, only 526 out of
333,045 workers (corresponding to 0.16 per cent) move from one sample establishment
to another.18
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 3 contain the results from the spell rst-di¤erenced
regressions. Since di¤erencing requires at least two consecutive time periods within
each spell, we need to exclude 448 spells with only one observation per spell. The
remaining number of spells is 333,125. Since one observation per spell is lost in rst
di¤erencing within each spell and 1,587 spells exhibit a gap in their time series, the
number of observations drops to 970,545. As expected, due to the tiny proportion
16With respect to di¤erences in technologies, rm-specic xed e¤ects capture e.g. production
processes that provide rms with higher rents and which may require compensating wage di¤erentials
(e.g. processes involving dangerous work). Such di¤erences might lead to a positive wage-rent
correlation which would not be due to rent-sharing (see e.g. Margolis and Salvanes 2001).
17Time-constant establishment variables are the east-west and the industry dummies.
18The low proportion of movers is due to the fact that the establishment data are a sample of
establishments, so that the probability of observing a worker moving from one sample establishment
to another is very small.
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Table 4: Movers and non-movers
Individuals Spell per Spells
Individual
Non-movers 332,519 1 332,519
Movers 524 2 1,048
Movers 2 3 6
All 333,045 333,573
Source: LIAB 1995-2001.
of individuals who change their employer, the estimates do not substantially di¤er
from the individual rst-di¤erenced estimates. As in specication (2), quasi-rents
are found to exert a signicantly lower impact on wages in establishments that are
subject to a centralised wage contract (Model (4)). Similar to Model (2), a Wald-test
fails to reject the null of a zero-rent coe¢ cient (with a p-value of 0.53). Although
the point-estimate of the interaction term for rm-specic contracts is negative, it is
not signicantly di¤erent from zero. Overall, our ndings therefore suggest that cen-
tralised wage bargaining suppresses any wage dispersion due to diverging protability
conditions, whereas rm-specic contracts and no collective bargaining coverage allow
wages to respond to local prots. Note that with spell level xed-e¤ects, unobserved
heterogeneity captures both individual and establishment e¤ects. An interesting issue
would be to recover estimates of i and j(i;t) and to examine whether unobservably
better individuals work in establishments that are characterised by (unobservable)
high-wage policies. However, owing to the low proportion of movers in our sample
we do not pursue this issue further, since for a large number of rms such an iden-
tication would have to rely on very little information to obtain estimates of the
establishment e¤ects.
5.5 The wage-prot correlation across various worker groups
Our earlier considerations on the individual determinants of rent-sharing suggested
that the relationship between wages and quasi-rents might systematically di¤er across
various worker groups. To test this notion, we additionally ran regressions separately
by gender, occupation (blue-collar and white-collar workers) and skill-types. Table
5 reports the results for males and females and for blue- and white-collar workers.
Columns (1) and (2) hold the results of the gender-specic regressions. For the
female sample, we obtain a coe¢ cient in non-covered establishments which amounts
to about 60 per cent of the corresponding point estimate for males. Even though
the di¤erence is not statistically signicant and may partly be attributed to gender
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di¤erences in the skill-composition19, the lower point estimate for females may be
interpreted as weak evidence for a lower rent-extraction of women. Note that this is
consistent with former evidence obtained by Arai (2001), Black and Strahan (2001),
Nekby (2003) and Martins (2004) among others. Given that the intercept e¤ect of
works-councils is much more pronounced among male individuals, this nding lends
some support to the hypothesis that rent-sharing in non-covered establishments partly
results from the local bargaining power of works councils who extract rents mainly on
behalf of male workers. As to the interaction terms, the signs of the rent-coe¢ cients
exhibit the same pattern as in the pooled regressions. For each group, the null
of 0 =  _CENT cannot be rejected (with p-values of 0.43 for males and 0.67
for females). Thus, industry-wide wage agreements appear to reduce inter-rm wage
di¤erentials both for men and women to a similar extent, indicating that the extent of
inter-rm wage compression under centralised contracts is stable across both groups.
Moreover, similar to the pooled regressions, the interaction terms for rm-specic
contracts are found to be not signicantly di¤erent from zero, and this result holds
for either group.
Columns (3) and (4) report the results for blue- and white-collar workers. First
of all, the point estimates in non-covered establishments are slightly larger for blue-
collar workers. Thus, the e¢ ciency wage hypothesis due to diverging supervision
intensities does not receive much support, because such mechanisms led us to ex-
pect the relationship between wages and quasi-rents to be larger among white-collar
workers. The results rather conrm the works-council bargaining power hypothesis
as the e¤ect of works councils on the mean wage turns out to be largest for blue-
collar workers. As to the interaction terms, centralised contracts appear to reduce
rent-sharing particularly among blue-collar workers. Among white-collar workers, the
interaction e¤ect is less negative and not statistically di¤erent from zero. While the
null of zero rent-sharing under centralised contracts cannot be rejected for blue-collar
workers (with a p-value of 0.82), this hypothesis is to be rejected at conventional lev-
els for white-collar workers. This nding lends some support to our hypothesis that
inter-rm wage di¤erentials of blue-collar workers are more likely to be compressed
by centralised contracts than those of white-collar workers.
Table 6 reports separate regression results for di¤erent skill-types. As before, in
non-covered establishments quasi-rents are found to exert a positive impact on wages.
Note, however, that due to the smaller sample size the estimates for low- and high-
skilled workers are much more imprecise than those for medium-skilled workers. As
19For example, the share of workers without any vocational degree is 28.2 per cent among female
workers and 15 per cent among male workers.
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Table 5: Rent-sharing across various worker groups
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female Male Blue-collar White-collar
 0.010 0.016 0.017 0.015
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007)
_CENT -0.011 -0.013 -0.016 -0.008
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
_FIRM 0.002 -0.003 -0.007 -0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
SIZE/1000 0.017 0.024 0.016 0.034
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013)
SIZE2/1000 -1.71e 07 -2.24e 07 -1.78e 07 -2.84e 07
(9.64e 08) (7.55e 08) (7.65e 08) (1.26e 07)
CENT 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
FIRM -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 0.008
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
WCOUNCIL -0.014 0.035 0.027 0.020
(0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014)
(K/L) 7.50e 04 0.001 9.90e 04 4.64e 04
(0.002) (9.33e 04) (0.001) (0.001)
Establishments 760 807 804 760
Observations 167,177 803,368 614,521 356,024
Adj. R2 0.110 0.074 0.076 0.133
Source: LIAB 1995-2001.
Note: The dependent variable is the rst-di¤erenced individual log daily wage.
All variables are spell rst-di¤erenced. Standard errors are in parentheses
and are adjusted for clustering at the establishment level.
For individual control variables see Tables 2 and 3.
All specications include 4 time dummies.
Signicant at 1%-level, Signicant at 5%-level.
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Table 6: Rent-sharing across skill-types
Model (1) (2) (3)
Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
 0.009 0.015 0.011
(0.006) (0.003) (0.014)
_CENT -0.011 -0.013 -0.004
(0.008) (0.004) (0.015)
_FIRM -0.003 -0.004 -0.008
(0.008) (0.004) (0.015)
SIZE/1000 0.019 0.018 0.047
(0.009) (0.007) (0.021)
SIZE2/1000 -2.21e 07 -1.83e 07 -3.94e 07
(9.95e 08) (7.17e 08) (2.03e 07)
CENT -0.008 0.006 -0.010
(0.008) (0.004) (0.023)
FIRM -0.018 0.002 0.021
(0.011) (0.005) (0.020)
WCOUNCIL 0.001 0.027 -0.002
(0.022) (0.007) (0.018)
(K/L) 0.005 0.001 -0.002
(0.006) (9.68e 04) (0.003)
Establishments 588 815 575
Observations 171,198 688,802 110,545
Adj. R2 0.060 0.091 0.258
Source: LIAB 1995-2001.
Note: See Table 5.
Low-skilled workers are those without any vocational degree,
medium-skilled are those holding a vocational degree, high-skilled
workers hold a technical university degree or a university degree.
Signicant at 1%-level, Signicant at 5%-level.
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hypothesized earlier, e¢ ciency wage mechanisms and bargaining power considerations
lead us to expect the relationship between wages and quasi-rents to be particularly
pronounced among the better educated. Although the estimates in non-covered es-
tablishments do not signicantly di¤er from each other, the higher point estimates
suggest the prot-e¤ect on wages to be larger among higher skill groups. Again,
when choosing among the alternative explanations, the results appear to favour the
works-council argument. The reason is that the rent-sharing e¤ect is largest for the
medium-skilled, whose mean wage outcomes benet the most from the existence of a
works council. As regards bargaining coverage, the signs of the rent-coe¢ cients ex-
hibit the same pattern as in the pooled regressions. As before, the interaction e¤ects
for rm-specic contracts are found to be very small and not signicantly di¤erent
from zero, and this is true for each skill group. Industry-wide wage agreements seem
to reduce inter-rm wage di¤erentials for all skill groups, even though the interac-
tion e¤ect is found to be signicant only for medium-skilled workers. The overall
e¤ect of quasi-rents on wages under centralised contracts is largest for high-skilled
workers (with a point estimate of about 0.007). Even though the estimated e¤ect
is very imprecise, this result may be interpreted as weak evidence for a more pro-
nounced inter-rm wage dispersion among high-skilled workers as compared to their
low- and medium-skilled counterparts. This nding is supportive of the notion that
inter-rm wage di¤erentials of high-skilled workers are less prone to be compressed
by centralised wage agreements than those of low- and medium-skilled workers, since
the latter are much more likely to be covered by collective contracts.
Given that 70 per cent of all non-covered establishments in our sample are located
in East Germany, a further concern might be that the pattern of responses to local
protability conditions is driven by systematic regional di¤erences in wage formation.
To investigate this issue, we ran separate regressions for East and West-German
establishments. The regressions yielded coe¢ cients of 0.008, -0.005 and 0.007 forWest
Germany and 0.015, -0.021 and -0.011 for East Germany (for no-coverage, centralised
contracts and rm-specic contracts, respectively). Even though the Eastern sample
is much smaller than the Western sample (125,089 versus 845,456 observations), the
coe¢ cients for Eastern establishments are all signicantly di¤erent from zero, whereas
the estimates for West Germany are all found to be insignicant. This exercise leads
us to conclude that centralised contracts seem to suppress inter-rm wage di¤erentials
in either region, while the prot-sensitivity of wages in non-covered establishments is
much more pronounced in East Germany.
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5.6 Endogeneity bias
Even though the use of quasi-rents instead of prots mitigates the endogeneity prob-
lem induced by the negative accounting relationship between wages and prots, our
protability measure might still be endogenous. A rst source of bias is a standard
simultaneity bias which occurs if wages, output and quasi-rents are jointly deter-
mined. In general, the direction of bias can go either way and largely depends on the
underlying relationship between output and employment. If there are, for example,
decreasing returns in the use of labour, high wages will cause quasi-rents per worker
to increase, and this will induce an upward-bias in the estimates of the rent-coe¢ cient
(see Abowd and Lemieux 1993). Second, because alternative wages and individual
wages are likely to be positively correlated, there will always be some source of down-
ward bias. The potential endogeneity of the protability measure raises the question
as to whether the pattern of previous results holds if the endogeneity of quasi-rents
is accounted for. For example, an important concern might be that the invariance
of wages against local protability conditions under centralised contracts was simply
caused by a downward-bias due the endogeneity of quasi-rents. To address this prob-
lem, we apply the di¤erenced Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator as
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). By exploiting available moment conditions
around the error term, this estimator instruments endogenous variables with suitable
lagged values. In particular, rst di¤erencing of eq. (1) causes any rst-di¤erenced
endogenous variable xit 1 to become correlated with the error term uit: In the
absence of second-order correlation in the error term, xit 2 and earlier lags will pro-
vide suitable instruments, since they will be uncorrelated with uit. Note that in
our specications, not only quasi-rents, but also their interactions with collective
bargaining coverage are likely to be endogenous variables.
Apart from instrumenting endogenous variables by their lagged values in t   2
and earlier, the di¤erenced GMM estimator provides an appropriate treatment of
predetermined variables which are assumed to be uncorrelated with uit and uit+1;
but are correlated with uit 1: As rst di¤erencing causes such variables to become
correlated with the error term uit, they are instrumented by lagged values in t  1
and earlier. In particular, we allow establishment size and the capital-labour ratio to
be predetermined in order to capture potential feedback e¤ects from wages in period
t on those covariates in subsequent periods. To test the validity of the moment
conditions, we present the Sargan/Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. This
test statistic calculates the correlation of the error terms with the instrument matrix
and has an asymptotic 2 distribution under the null that the moment conditions are
valid. Moreover, we report diagnostics for second-order serial correlation of the error
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terms (testing the null of no second-order serial correlation).
Table 7: First-di¤erenced GMM results
Model (1) (2) (3)
GMM(t-2) GMM(t-3) GMM(t-4)
 0.020 0.021 0.031
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
CENT -0.052 -0.058 -0.080
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
FIRM 0.020 0.026 0.024
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
SIZE/1000 0.042 0.045 0.043
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE2/1000 -4.63 07 -4.93e 07 -4.88e 07
(9.94e 09) (1.02e 08) (1.03e 08)
CENT 0.024 0.028 0.041
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
FIRM -0.027 -0.030 -0.033
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
WCOUNCIL 0.027 0.026 0.025
(8.36e 04) (8.75e 04) (8.89e 04)
(K/L) 0.001 0.001 0.003
(2.62e 04) (2.76e 04) (3.27e 04)
(EAST) -0.063 -0.068 -0.073
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Sargan-2(k) 16,301.74 (69) 15,376.87 (57) 13,324.12 (48)
(p value) 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) (p value) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Individuals 333,045 333,045 333,045
Observations 971,057 971,057 971,057
Signicant at 1%-level. Signicant at 5%-level.
Source: LIAB 1995-2001.
Note: The dependent variable is the rst-di¤erenced individual log daily wage
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. For remaining
covariates see Table 3. Results are reported for the one-step GMM-estimator.
Table 7 gives the results of the di¤erenced GMM estimates.20 The estimates
reported in Column (1) use lagged values of quasi-rents and their interactions with
collective bargaining coverage in t 2 and earlier as instruments. Turning to the main
variables of interest, the signs of the rent-coe¢ cients exhibit a similar pattern as the
20Because of the low mobility of individuals between sample plants, we conne the presentation
to the individual rst-di¤erenced estimates.
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individual and spell xed-e¤ects estimates in Table 3. While the rent-coe¢ cient is
signicantly positive for non-covered establishments, wages appear to be less sensitive
to rents if establishments are covered by a centralised wage agreement. Compared to
the xed-e¤ects estimates, the point estimate for non-covered establishments turns
out to be somewhat larger, suggesting that the endogeneity of quasi-rents led to a
slight downward bias in the xed-e¤ects estimates. Note that the overall e¤ect under
centralised agreements appears to be even negative, since a Wald-test rejects the null
of 0 =  _CENT at conventional levels. Interestingly, the interaction term for
rm-specic contracts is estimated to be signicantly positive, once the endogeneity
of quasi-rents is accounted for. Note that this is supportive of our hypothesis that
rm-specic contracts ought enable strong sector unions to skim o¤ a larger share of
rents than wage-setting acteurs in non-covered establishments. Overall, these results
indicate that the xed-e¤ects estimates neglecting the endogeneity of quasi-rents led
to a downward biased estimate of the rent-coe¢ cient under rm-specic contracts and
in non-covered establishments and to an upward-biased coe¢ cient under centralised
contracts. Note, however, that the overall performance of the GMM estimates turns
out to be somewhat disappointing, since the specication obviously fails to pass the
test of overidentifying restrictions and the AR(2)-test.
Given that lagged values in t  2 do not appear to be valid instruments for quasi-
rents and their interactions with collective bargaining coverage, we ran an additional
specication using lagged values since t   3 and earlier as instruments (reported
in Column (2)), and a further model using lagged values since t   4 and earlier
(reported in Column (3)). The estimates yield somewhat larger rent coe¢ cients (for
centralised contracts in absolute value). However, the Sargan statistics again fail
to conrm the validity of the moment conditions in either specication. In sum,
this leads us to judge the general performance of the GMM estimates to be rather
unsatisfactory. These objections notwithstanding, the estimates do at least appear
to preserve the pattern of results obtained by the xed-e¤ects estimates and point to
a remarkably stable pattern of the responsiveness of wages to prots. In particular,
the estimates indicate that a positive e¤ect of rents on wages prevails only in non-
covered establishments and under rm-specic contracts. As to the negative rent-
e¤ect under centralised contract, we do not want to over-interpret this nding.21 Yet,
it gives us some condence that the lower responsiveness of wages to local conditions
under centralised contracts was not simply caused by a downward-bias due to the
endogeneity of quasi-rents. The established pattern partly corroborates our results
21Theoretically, a negative relationship between prots and wages may for example arise as a result
in an implicit contract model, where rms are risk-loving and workers risk-averse (see Blanchower
et al. 1996).
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from recent work on the basis of establishment level data, where we failed to detect
any positive relationship between wages and establishment-specic quasi-rents under
centralised contracts. However, in nding a positive amount of rent-sharing under
rm-specic contracts, the present results stand in contrast to our earlier ndings
from the establishment-level estimations, which pointed to a complete insensitivity
of wages to local conditions under rm-specic contracts (Gürtzgen 2005). Note
that this di¤erence may partly be attributed to the more precise and encompassing
information on wages in the LIAB data, where wages are measured inclusive of fringe-
benets or bonus payments.
Given the coe¢ cients of 0.015 to 0.031 and mean quasi-rents per employee of 0.73,
the elasticity of individual wages with respect to quasi-rents is of the magnitude 0.01
to 0.02 in non-covered plants. In establishments subject to a rm-contract, elastic-
ities range from 0.02 to 0.07 (with coe¢ cients ranging from 0.013 and 0.055 and a
mean value of 1.22). Is is interesting to note that these gures are remarkably sim-
ilar to other estimates obtained with linked employer-employee data: Margolis and
Salvanes (2001) nd elasticities between 0.002 and 0.03 for France and corresponding
values of 0.006 between 0.01 for Norway. The relative magnitude of these elasticities
largely reect di¤erences in bargaining institutions in both countries, with rm-level
bargaining prevailing in France and a two-ladder system with sector-level bargain-
ing and subsequent rm-level negotiations being predominant in Norway. A similar
system prevails in Sweden, which is consistent with comparable estimates obtained
by Arai (2003), who reports an elasticity of 0.01. Finally, Martins (2004) reports
elasticities ranging between -0.031 and 0.078 for Portugal, which is characterised by
a mixed bargaining system of sectoral, single-rm and multi-rm contracts.
6 Summary and Conclusions
The aim of this paper was twofold: First, we have addressed the question of whether
German wages respond to rm-specic protability conditions and second, we have
been interested in whether the sensitivity of wages to rm-specic rents depends
on collective bargaining coverage. Theoretical considerations lead us to expect the
sensitivity of wages to rm-specic rents to be larger under rm-specic contracts
than in non-covered rms. The same is likely to hold for industry-wide agreements,
provided the bargaining parties make use of exibility provisions, which recently have
become a widespread element of central wage agreements. Since direct information on
the use of exibility provisions in rms subject to an industry-wide wage agreement
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is unavailable, we take our empirical ndings as indirect evidence of whether the use
of such provisions is a quantitatively important phenomenon in Germany.
Using linked employer-employee data from the mining and manufacturing sector,
our empirical analysis o¤ers a remarkably consistent picture: Individual wages are
found to be positively related to quasi-rents, but this seems to be conned to the non-
union sector and to establishments subject to rm-specic contracts. Industry-wide
wage contracts, however, appear to suppress any positive responsiveness of wages to
local protability conditions. While pooled OLS estimates yield a positive correla-
tion between wages and quasi-rents under centralised contracts, estimates accounting
for unobserved individual and establishment heterogeneity point to a coe¢ cient of
zero. Moreover, the pooled OLS upward-bias is found to be relatively larger under
centralised contracts. This nding is indicative of the presence of unobserved factors
that are positively related with prots and impact positively upon wages, and which
are particularly relevant under centralised contracts. One such factor may be that a
compressed wage structure under centralised wage contracts causes rms to upgrade
the quality of their workforce. This might lead to higher unobserved worker pro-
ductivity in such rms and therefore to (relatively larger) upward-biased estimates
in the simple pooled OLS-specication. Di¤erenced GMM estimates accounting for
the endogeneity of our protability measure even point to a negative relationship
between wages and local protability under centralised contracts. This leads us to
conclude that the lower responsiveness of wages to local protability conditions under
centralised contracts does not simply result from a downward-bias due to the endo-
geneity of quasi-rents. Moreover, we nd wages under rm-specic contracts to react
stronger to quasi-rents than in non-covered establishments, once the endogeneity of
quasi-rents is accounted for. This nding is supportive of our hypothesis that rm-
specic contracts ought enable strong sector unions to skim o¤ a larger share of rents
than, for example, works councils in non-covered establishments.
In examining the impact of collective bargaining coverage on the wage-prot re-
lationship, our ndings therefore suggest that centralised wage bargaining suppresses
any positive responsiveness to rm-specic protability conditions and that the use of
exibility provisions in central wage agreements appears to be empirically negligible.
Even though rms may pay wages above the going rate and may make use of opt-
out clauses, this potential for positive adjustments to local protability conditions
seems to be largely unused. To reconcile this result with the fact that a considerable
fraction of rms covered by a collective contract pay wages above the going rate,
we conclude from our ndings that such wages do not arise from more favourable
protability conditions, but rather reect observable and unobservable di¤erences in
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worker productivity.
Consistent with our hypotheses that the extent of inter-rm wage compression
under centralised contracts ought to be particularly pronounced among those workers
who are likely to be covered by collective contracts, we nd the wages of low- and
medium-skilled blue-collar workers to be most insensitive to local prots. In non-
covered establishments, we nd medium-skilled and male workers to benet to a
larger extent from their employersability-to-pay than unskilled and female workers,
which lends support to the hypothesis that rent-sharing in non-covered plants mainly
results from the bargaining power of works councils.
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A Appendix
A.1 Summary Statistics by Bargaining Coverage:
Variable Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev.
Centralised contract Firm-level contract No coverage
Individual characteristics
lnw 5.25 0.30 5.18 0.35 4.93 0.40
FEMALE 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.39 0.26 0.44
AGE 39.07 8.75 39.35 8.67 39.16 8.59
TENURE 146.31 85.95 128.89 84.67 94.21 71.74
FOREIGN 0.11 0.31 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24
WHITECOLL 0.36 0.48 0.41 0.49 0.32 0.47
VOCATIO 0.67 0.47 0.70 0.46 0.70 0.46
HIGHSCHOOL 4.5e 03 0.07 3.0e 03 0.06 3.8e 03 0.06
VOC-HIGH 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.16
TECHN-UNI 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23
UNI 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.21
Establishment characteristics
 1.09 0.87 1.22 0.96 0.73 0.79
SIZE 8,493.49 14,149.43 1,855.77 1,841.42 640.56 768.29
WCOUNCIL 0.98 0.14 0.97 0.16 0.72 0.45
K/L 1.75 2.19 4.00 11.36 2.20 4.86
EAST 0.11 0.31 0.25 0.44 0.48 0.50
Individuals 299,585 39,943 22,672
Establishments 582 185 310
Observations 1,152,080 105,640 47,985
Table A1: Summary statistics by bargaining coverage
Source: LIAB 1995-2001.
Note: Per-capita quasi rents and the capital-labour ratio are measured in 100,000 DM.
1 e corresponds to 1.95583 DM.
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